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The collapse of exports that has attended the current global economic recession threatens 
the export-led economic growth of the four Asian dragons. To better understand the 
economic performances and future prospects of the four dragons, this paper first examines 
the economic structural changes that have taken place in Hong Kong, China; the Republic of 
Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China, as well as the gradual shifting of the sources of 
economic growth away from the manufacturing sector and toward the service sector. 
Following this, a panel data set for the four dragons for the period 1995–2008 is constructed 
and a fixed-effects model applied to the data. The estimated coefficients deriving from the 
application of the model indicate that growth in the service sector, exports, and gross fixed 
capital formation each have a positive and statistically significant impact on economic 
growth. While the estimated coefficient is not significant, there is also a hint of a positive 
causal relationship between manufacturing sector growth rates and GDP. The empirical 
results confirm the shifts observed in industrial structures and the contribution of the service 
sector to economic growth. New service development (NSD), which integrates 
manufacturing output with high value-added services, is anticipated to be a new engine for 
economic growth and deserves more attention, especially in the realm of government 
policymaking within the four Asian dragons. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The economies of East Asia and Southeast Asia have historically featured generally sound 
developmental paths  with considerable macroeconomic stability. Among  them,  the four 
dragons of the newly industrialized economies (NIEs)
1
the
 were the best economic performers of 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, that is, until the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
These economies had   benefits of technical progress and lower labor costs to enhance 
the  development  of  their  capital-intensive industries,  and this development has, in turn, 
provided the capital and labor resources necessary for the growth of their service sectors. 
Although there has been some disagreement regarding sources of growth (Krugman 1994), 
the medium-term sustainability of growth for the economies in the region has generally been 
taken for granted. All four economies are classified as high-income economies by the World 
Bank and advanced economies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The recovery path 
from the Asian financial crisis was rather bumpy, although there was a quick rebound in 
1999. The bursting of the US high-tech bubble in 2001 resulted in another interruption to 
economic growth for these four export-oriented economies, which rely heavily on high-tech 
original equipment manufacturers (OEM) as their main source of export-led growth. 
The subprime loan crisis has had drastic consequences for economies  that  depend 
excessively on exports and the four NIEs in Asia are no exception. The severity of this global 
economic crisis  is  well represented by unemployment rates. In May–June 2009 
unemployment rates reached new levels, high for recent years, of 5.9%, 5.4%, and 4.0% 
respectively for Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China; while rates of 
9.5% and beyond were recorded for the United States and the Euro area. The decline in 
export growth was a primary  reason  for these levels of unemployment.  The growth of 
Singapore’s economy was flat over the same period. Taipei,China suffered a –44.5% decline 
in exports in January 2009 following its fourth-quarter fall in electronics exports in 2008. 
Hence, Taipei,China’s aggregate export growth rate also declined, falling 12% in the first 
quarter of 2009, and remaining negative until the fourth quarter of 2009. 
Over the last two to three decades, there has been a well-recognized and growing emphasis 
on the development of service sectors for the four Asian dragons, especially in Hong Kong, 
China. The dual currents of globalization and accelerating technological progress that have 
enabled services to predominate in the economies of most developed countries (Froehle et 
al. 2000) have also been assimilated into the newly industrialized economies. For example, 
throughout the period 1995–2008, the service sector was the major component of gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth in Singapore and service industries accounted for about 
66% of Singapore’s gross value-added over this time. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the experiences of 
the  Asian financial crisis in 1997,  the  bursting of the  high-tech bubble in 2001, and the 
subprime crisis in 2008  and  explores  their  implications  for  each of the four economies. 
Section 3 utilizes  a fixed-effects model  incorporating data related to  service sectors, 
manufacturing sectors, exports, and gross fixed capital formation, amongst other things, to 
examine the growth of economies and the industrial structures of the four economies for the 
period 1995–2008.  Section 4 presents and discusses the  concept of new service 
development (NSD), which strategically integrates existing strengths in both the service and 
manufacturing sectors  to promote industrial innovation,  as a tool to support growth 
rebalancing for Asia. This is linked with a discussion of the composition of international trade 
for each of the four Asian dragons, so as to shed some light on the future prospects for 
these economies. Section 5 discusses the macroeconomic stabilization policies that have 
                                                 
1 The term began to be used in the 1970s and 1980s when the four Asian dragons of Hong Kong, China; the 
Republic of Korea;  Singapore; and Taipei,China  rose to global  prominence with their  exceptionally fast 
industrial growth, commencing in the 1960s. All have now evolved far beyond the status of NIEs (Park and Ryu 
2006; Huang 2008). ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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been implemented within these four Asian economies in response  to the current global 
economic crisis. The final section offers some concluding points regarding the future paths of 
development for the four dragons and the associated preliminary policy implications. 
2.  OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS CRISES AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS  
Since the 1960s, East Asia has featured sustained rapid economic growth, with impressive 
structural change and substantial improvement in quality of living  standards.  During the 
period 1990–1996, East Asia, which accounted for around one fifth of world gross output, 
was responsible for half of all international economic growth and for two thirds of global 
investment. Most  people did not anticipate that the era of rapid growth, rising living 
standards, and increasing international competitiveness in Asian economies would be 
interrupted by a financial crisis. The sudden devaluation of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997 
marked the  onset of the Asian financial crisis. The waves of turbulence in currency and 
equity markets spread immediately from Thailand to Malaysia, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines,  and  had reached the Republic of Korea  and  Hong Kong, China  by  October 
1997. The Asian economies which were not hit hard, such as Singapore and Taipei,China, 
opted  to let their currencies devalue or float rather than resist the speculative pressure 
building against them. With this crisis the first bout of truly global contagion ensued, as stock 
markets in the United States and Europe fell sharply, and as other emerging market 
economies were forced to raise interest rates in order to prevent a “run” on currencies. 
Among the four NIEs, Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; and Singapore suffered 
negative economic growth in 1998 but quickly rebounded in 1999. Taipei,China, on the other 
hand,  maintained  a positive GDP growth  rate  of  4.55% in 1998—a drop of  2.04%  from 
6.59% in 1997—yet it was the last economy to rebound after the crisis and its recovery was 
slow. The basic diagnosis was that East Asia had exposed itself to the crisis by maintaining 
volatile capital flows which led to currency instability and extremes in interest rates
2
The deep decline in the US’ electronics sector in 2001 resulted in another interruption to the 
economic growth of the export-oriented economies of the four Asian dragons. The sharp fall 
in high-tech exports saw the GDP growth rates of Hong Kong, China and the Republic of 
Korea  slow to 0.50% and 3.84% respectively (Tables 1 and 2) while in Singapore and 
Taipei,China growth rates slipped to –2.37% and –2.17% respectively (Tables 3 and 4)  in 
2001, an even worse outcome than that which followed the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The 
2001 recession was the worst experienced by Taipei,China in more than four decades and it 
indicated problems of over-concentration on lower-end high-tech exports. 
 (Hsieh 
2000), which in turn had caused inefficient investment spending and jeopardized the stability 
of the banking system (Radelet and Sachs 1998).  the Republic of Korea’s extensive 
industrial restructuring  contributed, at least partly, to its deep-V rebound to 9.49%  GDP 
growth in 1999. The remaining three Asian dragons all made significant and confidence-
reviving improvements in their financial and other sectors. 
At the time of the outbreak of the subprime loan crisis in 2008, most Asian economies were 
models of prudence. While American and European households were borrowing up to the 
hilt, their Asian equivalents were tucking away their savings. Yet many countries in Asia 
seem to have been hit harder by the crisis than their spendthrift Western counterparts. In the 
last quarter of 2008, GDP slumped by around 15% and exports fell by more than 50% for the 
four dragon  economies. The 1997 financial crisis had been  caused by Asia’s excessive 
                                                 
2 The Asian financial crisis has its roots in attempts at financial reforms in East Asia in the early 1990s. The East 
Asia embarked on financial market deregulation and capital flow liberalization in the second half of the 1980s, 
and the process of liberalization was accelerated in the 1990s. The financial reforms were aimed at upgrading 
financial institutions, but in fact left the economies exposed to the instabilities of international financial markets. ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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dependence on foreign capital and, during this crisis, the four Asian NIEs had been tripped 
up by their excessive dependence on exports. Similarly, by September 2008 Taipei,China’s 
exports had already slumped dramatically (Ministry of Finance; Taipei,China 2009). While 
the other three economies still enjoyed double digit (year-on-year) export growth rates, by 
the fourth quarter of 2008 all four dragons were experiencing negative growth in GDP and an 
economic recession ensued (World Bank 2009). 
The global economic crisis, which  originated  with  the subprime loan crisis in the United 
States, has had a severe impact on the entire world. Asia and the United States are deeply 
linked in many ways and the US is the main export market for the four dragons. The crisis 
resulted in a slump in export earnings for many Asian economies, including the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), India, Japan, the four dragons, and others. Low economic growth 
rates  of  around  2.0%  were observed in 2009  for Singapore and Hong Kong, China,  a 
consequence of their large financial service sectors and their  export-oriented industries, 
which featured the US as a major export partner. In the Republic of Korea, exports fell a 
year-on-year 32.8% in January 2009.  
The  governments  of  the  four Asian dragons opted to support their  domestic financial 
systems  and  provided  fiscal stimuli  for economic growth. Economically, the Republic of 
Korea is one of the few Asian countries running a current account deficit (US$12.6 billion in 
January–August 2008). With banks leveraged and loan-deposit ratios of more than 130%, 
the Republic of Korea’s stock market and currency face  precipitous challenges, as 
companies in the Republic of Korea have hoarded dollars for debts. 
The four dragons  were all undermined by the global economic recession, and further 
affected by the slump in world trade. Mainly due to their excessive dependence on exports, 
the four economies all suffered  from  the global downturn although  the economic 
performance of each individual economy varied significantly. For this reason, a brief profile 
of each economy will be illustrated below. 
2.1  Hong Kong, China 
The economy opened 2009 with a recession of –7.79% growth in GDP in the first quarter, 
year-on-year, as compared with an average growth performance of 3.76% over 2004–2008 
(Table 1). Given the importance of financial services and international trade to this economy, 
a severe economic downturn was to be expected. Although Hong Kong, China is one of the 
freest economies in the world, its export growth rate dropped to its lowest point in the first 
quarter of 2009. 
The Government of Hong Kong, China  implemented  expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies  commencing in September 2008.  The  Hong Kong Monetary Authority  (HKMA) 
injected HK$179 billion (US$23 billion)  into the banking system through open market 
operations and de-linked the base rate from interbank rates,  among other monetary 
measures.  As an example of its expansionary fiscal policies, in December 2008 the 
government announced an HK$100 billion (US$12.8 billion) package of loan guarantees for 
small and medium-sized firms. One of the major concerns affecting economic prospects was 



































1995  2.293  23490  7.736  3.210  100.383    10073  9.916 
1996  4.193  24040  7.734  2.830  106.742  63,840  13451  5.646 
1997  5.056  25940  7.742  2.210  112.933  92,823  10723  4.815 
1998  (6.026)  24880  7.745  4.580  116.133  89,625  10049  (4.458) 
1999  2.556  25490  7.758  6.200  111.550  96,256  16962  4.517 
2000  7.951  26570  7.791  4.930  107.375  107,545  15096  16.268 
2001  0.497  25930  7.799  5.080  105.650  111,174  11397  (1.672) 
2002  1.841  24870  7.799  7.270  102.442  111,921  9321  9.042 
2003  3.006  25720  7.787  7.850  99.800  118,387  12576  12.797 
2004  8.467  27490  7.788  6.740  99.417  123,569  14230  15.422 
2005  7.082  28150  7.777  5.570  100.325  124,280  14876  10.598 
2006  7.020  29530  7.768  4.760  102.350  133,210  19965  9.439 
2007  6.380  31560  7.801  3.980  104.425  152,702  27813  8.045 




3.763  26435  7.772  4.903  105.602  115,990  14351  7.535 
2008Q1  7.283  32346  7.782  3.400  107.733  160,775  22849  10.481 
2008Q2  4.115  31391  7.800  3.300  109.400  157,609  22102  7.906 
2008Q3  1.505  30604  7.799  3.400  109.233  160,557  18016  5.527 
2008Q4  (2.641)  29354  7.754  4.100  109.233  182,539  14387  (2.111) 
2009Q1  (7.791)  --  7.754  5.200  109.567  186,287  13576  (21.922) 
2009Q2  (5.100)  --  7.751  5.400  109.333  206,996  18379  (12.899) 
2009Q3  (2.200)  --  7.751  5.300  108.267  222,757  20417  (14.300) 
2009Q4  2.600  --  7.751  4.900  110.700  250,718  21815  (2.000) 
Sources: Annual data are mainly from World Development Indicators (WDI) Online Databases of the World Bank (at 
http://www.worldbank.org/). The quarterly data have been compiled from various government official websites, such 
as the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (at http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/) and the Hong Kong Census and Statistics 
Department (at http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/). 
Notes: UE rate = unemployment rate; CPI = Consumer Price Index; Stock price indexes are end of season or year 
data. 
2.2  Republic of Korea 
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Republic of Korea, with the help of the IMF’s US$58 
billion support package, successfully bounced back from a  large amount of short-term 
foreign debt, a dramatic drop in the value of the Korean won, and a general deterioration in 
financial conditions. However, the  severe  effects of the present global downturn and the 
weakening of domestic demand have made the current crisis much fiercer than that of 1997 
(Nanto 2009). GDP growth contracted to –4.25% in the first quarter of 2009 and leveled out 
in the second quarter at –2.51%, on a year-on-year basis (Table 2), well below the 2003–
2008 average of 4.79%. Throughout the 2008 economic recession, price pressures have ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
 
5 
mainly been due to a weaker won and higher prices for oil and other commodities. In 2008, 
year-average inflation accelerated to 4.7%, well above the Bank of Korea’s 2.5–3.5% target 
band. A reflection of poor economic performance, the Republic of Korea’s labor market has 
been sluggish, with an unemployment rate that peaked at 3.833% in the first and second 
quarters  of  2009 (Park 2008). As compared with other OECD countries, public social 
expenditure remains extremely low and has resulted in an underdeveloped welfare services 
sector.  

































1995  9.169  10770  771.273  2.060  69.873  32,712  883  24.385 
1996  6.999  12070  804.453  2.040  73.314  33,237  651  12.165 
1997  4.651  12190  951.289  2.600  76.569  20,405  376  21.626 
1998  (6.854)  9200  1401.440  6.960  82.322  52,041  562  12.652 
1999  9.486  9220  1188.820  5.686  82.991  74,055  1028  14.622 
2000  8.486  9800  1130.960  4.425  84.866  96,198  505  19.144 
2001  3.837  10580  1290.990  4.017  88.317  102,821  694  (2.729) 
2002  6.970  11280  1251.090  3.283  90.757  121,413  628  13.256 
2003  3.097  12060  1191.610  3.567  93.946  155,352  811  15.604 
2004  4.730  14040  1145.320  3.683  97.320  199,066  896  19.575 
2005  4.198  15930  1024.120  3.733  100.000  210,391  1379  8.544 
2006  5.134  17780  954.790  3.467  102.242  238,956  1434  11.830 
2007  4.973  19730  929.260  3.250  104.833  262,224  1897  12.105 




4.793  12665  1081.245  3.710  89.792  128,578  919  14.027 
2008Q1  5.463  19721  982.51  3.400  107.400  264,246  1704  17.403 
2008Q2  4.346  19512  1018.840  3.100  109.633  258,098  1675  23.130 
2008Q3  3.114  19281  1067.310  3.067  111.100  239,672  1448  27.031 
2008Q4  (3.400)  18063  1365.487  3.133  110.800  201,223  1124  (9.878) 
2009Q1  (4.249)  --  1416.073  3.833  111.600  206,340  1206  (25.019 
2009Q2  (2.514)  --  1285.893  3.833  112.667  231,735  1390  (20.428) 
2009Q3  1.000  --  1238.887  3.600  113.300  245,738  1607  17.582 
2009Q4  6.000  --  1168.033  3.330  113.467  268,358  1606  11.712 
Sources: Annual data are mainly from the World Development Indicators (WDI) Online Databases of the World Bank 
(at http://www.worldbank.org/). The quarterly data have been compiled from various official websites of the 
Government of the Republic of Korea, such as the Republic of Korea Ministry of Finance and Economy (at 
http://finance.mapsofworld.com/finance/ministry/korea.html) and the Bank of Korea (at http://ecos.bok.or.kr/). 
Notes: U/E rate = unemployment rate; CPI = Consumer Price Index; Stock price indexes are end of season or year 




2.3  Singapore 
Singapore was the first Asian country to fall into a recession following the current global 
economic crisis in July 2008 (Thangavelu and Toh 2005). GDP growth was just 1.15% per 
annum on average in 2008, far short of the five-year average of 7.30% in 2003–2007 and 
the slowest since 2001. This reflects the high correlation between the global business cycle 
and Singapore’s economic performance. The 1997 Asian financial crisis saw Singapore face 
the impact of adverse spillover effects on exporting for a short period. As shown in Table 3, 
Singapore’s GDP growth slumped from a positive 8.34% in 1997 to a negative 1.38% in 
1998. To ensure the long-term competitiveness of its economy, Singapore decided not to 
tinker with the nominal exchange rate and pressed ahead with financial reforms (Fock and 
Wong 2001). 
The global downturn that commenced in 2008 hit this exceptionally open economy with full 
force. GDP growth slowed continuously from 6.66% in the first quarter of 2008, year-on-year, 
until the economy contracted by –4.23% in the fourth quarter (Table 3). The impact of the 
global downturn was most evident in exports, which slumped from growth of 11.43% in the 
third quarter to –11.99% in the fourth quarter of 2008, dropping further to –25.32% in the 
second quarter of 2009. As shown by these figures, Singapore was among the hardest hit 



































1995  8.155  23260  1.417  1.700  93.001  68,819  1917  10.400 
1996  7.790  25130  1.410  1.625  94.283  76,968  1992  9.100 
1997  8.341  27160  1.485  1.425  96.191  71,378  1508  8.800 
1998  (1.377)  23490  1.674  2.500  95.930  75,021  1393  (11.800) 
1999  7.202  22880  1.695  2.800  95.953  77,048  2480  5.500 
2000  10.060  22970  1.724  2.625  97.246  80,170  1927  11.800 
2001  (2.374)  21090  1.792  2.625  98.232  75,677  1624  (7.400) 
2002  4.107  20870  1.791  3.550  97.849  82,219  1341  2.400 
2003  3.771  22180  1.742  4.000  98.325  96,244  1765  16.344 
2004  9.299  24330  1.690  3.400  99.968  112,575  2066  24.328 
2005  7.307  26210  1.664  3.125  100.440  116,173  2347  16.084 
2006  8.352  28930  1.589  2.675  101.418  136,261  2986  17.676 
2007  7.766  32340  1.507  2.100  103.543  162,957  3482  10.828 




5.682  24680  1.614  2.598  98.762  100,407  2042  8.561 
2008Q1  6.659  39645  1.409  1.900  108.358  177,462  3007  11.519 
2008Q2  2.514  38104  1.366  2.200  109.845  176,650  2948  13.230 
2008Q3  0.043  37186  1.397  2.300  111.103  168,802  2359  11.427 
2008Q4  (4.226)  35599  1.487  2.500  111.844  174,196  1762  (11.999) 
2009Q1  (10.140)  --  1.512  3.300  110.659  166,251  1700  (27.766) 
2009Q2  (2.800)  --  1.472  3.300  109.310  173,191  2333  (25.321) 
2009Q3  0.600  --  1.439  3.400  100.09  177,476  2641  (19.994) 
2009Q4  4.000  --  1.394  2.100  100.410  187,015  2760  4.885 
Sources: Annual data are mainly from World Development Indicators (WDI) Online Databases of the World Bank (at 
http://www.worldbank.org/). The quarterly data have been compiled from various official government websites, such 
as the Singapore Ministry of Manpower (at http://www.mom.gov.sg/Pages/default.aspx), and the Monetary Authority 
of Singapore (at http://www.mas.gov.sg/). 
Notes: U/E rate = unemployment rate; CPI = Consumer Price Index; Stock price indexes are end of season or year 
data. 
2.4  Taipei,China 
Among the four dragons, Taipei,China was the only one to remain relatively intact following 
the severe damage arising from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, as shown in Table 4. The 
fact that its financial market was conservative, with only partially deregulated international 
capital  flows,  kept the economy  relatively  secure from the regional financial crisis. The 
economy had undergone a successful economic restructuring in the early 1990s, and the 
construction industry as a driver of growth had been replaced by information processing, 
semiconductors, and electronics (Hsu 2001). 
In late 2009, external demand for this economy’s manufactured products, including its vital 
electronics exports, slumped. Following a  hard blow to electronics exports in the fourth-
quarter of 2008, Taipei,China suffered a severe economic downturn that was unmitigated ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
 
8 
until the third  quarter  of  2009. Heavily dependent on external trade, this  economy  has 
suffered more than most of the Asian economies since the second half of 2008, as the global 
slowdown has cut into world trade. The global effects of the slowdown, combined with a 
contraction in domestic demand, saw GDP growth average  at only 0.058% in 2008 and 
contract to  –10.24%  (year-on-year)  in the first quarter of 2009 (Table 4). Even though 
substantial fiscal stimulus was initiated  in the beginning of 2009  and interest rates were 
lowered, the economy shrank by about another 4.00% before a mild rebound occurred in the 
following year. 






























1995  6.490  12906  26.476  1.791  89.578  90,310  5174  12.580 
1996  6.300  13527  27.458  2.603  92.333  88,038  6934  6.750 
1997  6.590  13904  28.662  2.717  93.166  83,502  8187  9.230 
1998  4.550  12679  33.445  2.691  94.733  90,341  6418  2.770 
1999  5.750  13609  32.266  2.924  94.900  106,200  8449  11.710 
2000  5.770  14519  31.225  2.991  96.088  106,742  4739  18.860 
2001  (2.170)  13093  33.800  4.570  96.083  122,211  5551  (7.760) 
2002  4.640  13291  34.575  5.167  95.888  161,656  4452  10.630 
2003  3.500  13587  34.418  4.992  95.623  206,632  5891  10.380 
2004  6.150  14663  33.422  4.436  97.166  241,738  6140  14.400 
2005  4.160  15714  32.167  4.128  99.406  253,290  6548  7.620 
2006  4.800  16111  32.531  3.905  100.000  266,148  7824  10.260 
2007  5.700  16855  32.842  3.908  101.798  270,311  8506  8.820 




4.449  14396  31.772  3.640  96.582  169,916  6386  8.563 
2008Q1  6.247  18140  31.529  3.867  103.413  286,860  8573  17.544 
2008Q2  4.557  17851  30.439  3.867  104.890  291,405  7524  18.548 
2008Q3  (1.047)  16894  31.185  4.157  106.737  281,130  5719  8.034 
2008Q4  (8.610)  15603  32.983  4.680  106.513  291,707  4591  (24.740) 
2009Q1  (10.241)  --  33.982  5.623  103.407  300,122  5211  (36.683) 
2009Q2  (6.850)  --  33.131  5.840  104.007  317,564  6432  (31.979) 
2009Q3  (1.000)  --  32.797  6.080  105.300  326,250  7137  (20.869) 
2009Q4  9.200  --  32.315  5.850  105.170  345,536  7703  16.933 
Sources: Annual data are mainly from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), 
Taipei,China (at http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw/). The quarterly data have been compiled from various official government 
websites, such as the Ministry of Finance (at http://www.mof.gov.tw/). 
U/E rate = unemployment rate; CPI = Consumer Price Index 
Note: Stock price indexes are end of season or year data. 
The economic performances reviewed above have motivated the utilization of a fixed-effects 
model, incorporating the growth rates of service sectors, manufacturing sectors, exports, and 
gross fixed capital formation  in  these  economies,  in the  next section. Through  empirical 
investigation, we may observe the process through which the main driving force for GDP 
growth gradually shifts from manufacturing sectors toward service sectors, which, in turn, ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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could explain the causes of the excessive dependence on exports witnessed in these four 
economies during the crises in 1997 and 2001, and again in 2008. 
3.  ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURES 
As discussed, the four Asian dragons were noted for their outward-oriented development 
strategies and associated high growth rates from the early 1960s to the 1980s. However, 
before achieving such rapid growth each of the four was a developing economy dependent, 
in the main, on primary industries. They seized the opportunity when advanced economies 
began  moving  their labor-intensive  industries  to  less  developed  economies.  Taking 
advantage of  the  superiority of their  local labor forces, these four  economies  attracted 
external capital and technology and, in turn, were transformed into advanced, high-income 
economies within two to three decades. Moreover, they became examples of successful 
economic development. In the following Tables 5 and 6, we can observe the progression of 
changes in the industrial structures of the four dragons during the period of 1995–2008. For 
example, in Singapore and Hong Kong, China, the shares of value-added in GDP for the 
manufacturing sectors decrease, while the shares for the service sectors increase. As for the 
Republic of Korea and Taipei,China, as GDP increases, the shares for the manufacturing 
sectors remain more or less stable while the shares for the service sectors increase slightly. 
Hence, there is a consistent trend of increasing shares of service sectors in their respective 
GDPs and,  almost overall,  changes  in  industrial structures  took place  in the four Asian 
dragons. 
The process of development for the four Asian dragons has become the role model for other 
developing  economies  around the world. However, this development pattern has  many 
drawbacks such as over-reliance  on international capital—a  danger  which  explains  the 
heavy losses of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Therefore, we discuss the role of service 
sector since 1997 Asian financial crisis to shed the light for 2008 global economic recession 
and, in turn, the structural changes in these four economies. As seen in Tables 1 to 4, the 
Asian dragons were hit hard during the  1997 Asian financial crisis and all, excepting 
Taipei,China, suffered from negative GDP growth rates. The subprime loan crisis in 2008 
deadened the US economy, which  resulted in decreasing demand for the exports of  its 
trading partners, as  reflected  in  the figures pertaining to  GDP growth rates. In order to 
assess the potential impacts of industrial structural changes on economic growth during the 
crisis periods, we first review the industrial structures in terms of share of value-added in 
GDP, for the service and manufacturing sectors respectively, for each of the four economies 









Republic of Korea  Singapore  Taipei,China 
1995  84.69  51.80  64.69  63.89 
1996  85.19  52.77  64.96  64.53 
1997  85.86  53.42  65.28  65.70 
1998  85.67  54.22  64.66  66.42 
1999  86.08  54.51  65.89  67.66 
2000  86.52  54.39  64.27  68.93 
2001  87.34  56.29  66.87  70.53 
2002  88.25  57.46  67.02  69.98 
2003  89.17  57.22  67.83  70.38 
2004  89.92  55.56  66.29  70.79 
2005  90.62  56.32  67.17  71.29 
2006  91.16  57.10  66.96  71.36 
2007  92.24  59.99  69.41  70.71 
2008  94.88  60.31  72.15  69.26 
Source: The data for Taipei,China are from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DGBAS), 
Taipei,China (at http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw/) while the data for the other three economies are from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Online Databases (at http://www.worldbank.org/). 
The great importance of the service sector in the economic activities of most industrialized 
countries has increased the range of statistical information collected in this area (Mansell 
1996). There has been controversial debate over structural change as a source of economic 
growth, which has centered upon long-term structural shifts from the manufacturing sector 
towards the service sector. As for the four dragons, technological progress from abroad 
helped them to develop the infrastructure of their manufacturing sectors and the superiority 
of their local labor forces helped upgrade their service industries, which indirectly supported 
the service of manufacturing industries. The lack of adequate data with which to properly 
measure performance have made, argue Landefeld, Seskin, and Fraumeni (2008), some 
areas of the economy, like services, perpetually difficult to measure and to categorize. For 
this reason, Triplett and Bosworth (2004) have argued that measurements of productivity 
underestimate the overall contribution of the service sector. 
The calculation for the labor productivity of manufacturing sector and service sector is very 
different.  First, there are many  more job opportunities  offered  by the  service sector, as 
compared to the manufacturing sector, for high-income economies, and these have various 
skill requirements and are open to roughly half of the labor force. On average, the real value-
added income per worker  in  service sector  is  showed  lower than that  in manufacturing 
(Besley 2007). While some studies question that the demand for skilled labor has risen, the 
demand for unskilled labor has undoubtedly fallen greatly in the service sector. Besley (2007) 
demonstrated that not all service sector production is low value-added or deploys workers 
with  less productivity than that of the manufacturing  sector, and confirmed the service 
sector’s significance and contribution to productivity and overall economic growth. Second, 
the service sector may not directly benefit from technical innovation. Malgorzata and Marcin 
(2009)  argue  that the impulse from technological progress initially enhanced  labor 
productivity in the manufacturing sector and consequently resulted in an increase in capital 
formation. The impulse from technological progress only shows the relationship between the ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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rate of GDP growth and the manufacturing sector. However, the role of the service sector in 
supporting  manufacturing industries, for example through technical consulting and 
professional services, has been greatly neglected for a long time. Third, there are difficulties 
in measuring the productivity of the service sector. To prove that productivity has been rising 
in services, Besley (2007) measured changes in the level of real value-added income per 
worker between 1985 and 2004. However, Besley (2007) thought that there were inherently 
more difficult aspects to the measurement of services—in terms of both price and quantity—
than  is  the case with  goods.  Francesco  and Mario (2008) investigated the relationships 
between innovation, demand, and productivity in both the manufacturing and service sectors. 
Their article presents the data on innovation in services, with an emphasis on the services 
that represent the largest components of modern economies, in an effort to fuel the recent 
systematic attempt to achieve fair recognition for services. 
Table 6: Shares of Value-Added in GDP for Manufacturing Sectors 
Year 
(%) 
Hong Kong, China Republic of Korea  Singapore  Taipei,China 
1995  7.68  27.63  26.54  25.32 
1996  6.75  26.69  25.17  25.47 
1997  6.04  26.33  24.05  25.18 
1998  5.64  27.34  24.14  24.81 
1999  5.30  28.13  24.27  24.02 
2000  5.43  29.42  27.69  23.76 
2001  4.85  27.59  24.49  22.73 
2002  4.20  26.90  25.64  23.68 
2003  3.73  26.44  25.37  23.69 
2004  3.57  28.60  27.67  23.72 
2005  3.42  28.37  27.13  23.21 
2006  3.22  27.12  26.94  23.04 
2007  2.54  27.28  24.91  24.01 
2008  2.37  28.10  20.76  27.33 
Sources: The data for Taipei,China are from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DGBAS), 
Taipei,China (at http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw/) while the data for the other three economies are from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Online Databases (at http://www.worldbank.org/). 
As shown in  Table  5  above, the shares of the  service sectors  in  GDP  were  increasing 
continually throughout most of the  period  1995–2008.  The trend of globalization and 
accelerating technological progress have enabled services, which have predominated in the 
economies of most developed countries, to be assimilated into economies such as the four 
Asian NIEs. Obviously, the growth of these economies was interrupted by the onset of Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 and the bursting of the US high-tech bubble in 2001. As Figure 1 and 
Table 7 demonstrate, over the period 1995–2008, the average growth rates of GDP in the 
four Asian dragons ranged  from 3.76%  to 5.62%  and experienced  high  volatility.  The 
development strategy since then has shifted the emphasis of production from labor-intensive 
to more capital-intensive technologies and, therefore, fewer jobs have been created. These 
recent economic structural changes have made the question of how to create more jobs 
from the  increasingly important service sectors in these outward-orientated  economies a 
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Hong Kong, China Korea Singapore Taipei,China
 
Sources: The data for Taipei,China are from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DGBAS), 
Taipei,China (at http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw/) while the data for the other three economies are from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Online Databases(at http://www.worldbank.org/). 
Note: Korea=The Republic of Korea 
Table 7: Summaries of GDP Growth Rates in the Four Asian Dragons 1995–2008 




Singapore  Taipei,China 
Average  3.76  4.79  5.62  4.86 
C.V.  1.01  0.84  0.71  0.46 
Max  8.47  9.49  10.06  6.59 
Min  (6.03)  (6.85)  (2.40)  (2.17) 
Source: Figure 1. 
Note: C.V. = Coefficient of Variation 
Some economists have even stated that the economies of Singapore and Hong Kong, China 
rely too much on the PRC when the PRC becomes the world's second largest economy.
3
                                                 
3 The PRC has risen to become the world’s second largest economy and the third largest trading nation. The 
global economic crisis of 2008 has weakened the US and significantly strengthened the PRC’s international 
status (Sally 2009). 
 
This results in  over-reliance  on international capital and/or international markets,  and 
especially on the international markets’ relationship with the PRC. A myriad of reasons have 
been offered to account for the variety in impact of 1997’s financial turmoil on the Asian 
economies. The most often quoted reason for difference has been the degree of openness 
of the economy to foreign investment and especially the extent of liberalization of financial 
markets to global capital (Chiu 2006). The PRC’s manufacturing industries market provided 
Singapore and Hong Kong, China  with  an attractive base  from which to develop their 
international trade relationships with other countries. The four Asian dragons all adopted an 
export-oriented development pattern in order to gain access to international markets, obtain 
advanced technology,  attract inflows of capital,  and  even make the domestic import – ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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substitution industries also more competitive. In the process of emerging economic power, 
the further improvement of infrastructure in PRC may need the professional and financial 
services support of Hong Kong, China and/or Singapore.
4
Table 8: Share of Gross Fixed Capital Formation in 
 Gross fixed capital formation is 
the basic element in the  construction of a country’s  infrastructure,  but its share in GDP 
decreases (Table 8) when GDP grows enormously (Hsieh, 2000). As a result, the sources of 
economic growth gradually shift from the manufacturing sector towards the service sector 








Singapore  Taipei,China 
1995  29.96785  37.31330  33.75659  22.71877 
1996  30.78413  37.48514  38.32585  21.75788 
1997  33.10496  35.62383  38.97374  22.62790 
1998  30.06971  30.34777  37.85415  23.57814 
1999  25.68374  29.72758  34.14702  22.95221 
2000  26.36320  31.09016  30.59059  23.65750 
2001  25.63421  29.54271  29.97106  19.36713 
2002  22.39271  29.08929  25.45825  18.70679 
2003  21.18434  29.91783  23.94139  18.38523 
2004  21.28873  29.53842  23.36592  20.68954 
2005  20.91509  29.27019  21.64202  20.09887 
2006  21.84319  29.04305  22.68496  19.34559 
2007  20.33374  28.77903  24.92310  18.64937 
2008  20.36495  31.40837  30.89127  18.41222 
Sources: The data for Taipei,China are from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DGBAS), 
Taipei,China (at http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw/) while the data for the other three economies are from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Online Databases(at http://www.worldbank.org/). 
Note: Gross fixed capital formation is defined as expenditures by government and the business sector on buildings, 
engineering, construction, and machinery and equipment. 
The  main  impact  deriving from all of  these crises was the  lowering of demand for raw 
materials and primary commodities and this had a strong direct impact on economic growth. 
The decline  in exports of primary commodities resulted, in turn, in  a dive in volumes of 
manufacturing exports (Khalafalla and Webb 2001; Hussain, Mlambo, and Oshikoya 1999). 
The current crisis has resulted in decreased demand for commodity  exports  and  trade-
related services, especially  in the  outward-oriented  emerging economies  (Borchert  and 
Mattoo 2009). As presented in Figure 1, the growth rates in GDP for these four economies 
are correlated with exports (Figure 2), while the more severe fluctuation in the growth rates 
for exports are depicted in Figure 2. 
                                                 
4 East Asia became vulnerable to external financial shocks in part because it attempted to reform its financial 
markets in the 1990s in a market-oriented manner. These reforms led to a drastic increase in both the number 
of banks as well as their linkages to international markets, which, in turn, increased the exposure of these 
economies to international financial shocks, mainly through the remarkable buildup of short-term debts. East 
Asian economies with stronger financial systems (e.g., Singapore and Hong Kong, China) had taken steps to 
redress inadequate regulations and poor supervision, and thus were less prone to a crisis (Radelet and Sachs 
1998). ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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Hong Kong, China Korea Singapore Taipei,China
 
Sources: The data for Taipei,China are from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DGBAS), 
Taipei,China (at http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw/) while the data for the other three economies are from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (WDI) Online Databases (at http://www.worldbank.org/). 
Note: Korea=The Republic of Korea 
To investigate the effects of changes in industrial structure, the growth rates of the service 
sector, manufacturing sector, exports as a proportion of  GDP,  and  gross fixed capital 
formation, among others,  have been  incorporated  into a fixed-effects model in order to 
investigate the determinants of the growth of the four economies for the period 1995–2008 
(from the 1997 financial crisis to the subprime crisis in 2008). 
3.1  Materials and Methods 
To examine the possible effects of industrial structural changes, a panel data set for the four 
Asian dragons has been collected for regression analysis. The fixed-effects model has been 
utilized mainly because of the specificity of the characteristics of each individual economy. 
For example, the individual specific effects arising from elements such as institutional and 
policy settings may be highly correlated with the independent variables. The fixed-effects 
model employed is shown below:  
        GDP_Git = C + MFG_Git + SVC_Git + EXPORT_Git + GFCF_Git + εit
Where: 
                
(1) 
i refers to the i
th economy and t represents the t
th
C is the constant; 
 time point; 
GDP_Git
MFG_G
 is the growth rate of GDP; 
it
SVC_G
 is the growth rate of the manufacturing sector; 
it
EXPORT_G
 is the growth rate of the service sector; 
it
GFCF_G
 is the growth rate of exports; 





 is the error term. 
The fixed-effects model represents the overall impact of explanatory variables on the GDP 
growth rates of the economies, while their non-random differences will be captured in the 
economy-specific constant term. The data have been gathered from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) Online Databases of the World Bank for the period 1995–2008, however 
the data for  Taipei,China is from the  Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting,  and 
Statistics (DGBAS), Taipei,China. For the panel analysis, the variables of the growth rates 
for the manufacturing sector, the service sector, exports, and gross fixed capital formation 
have been chosen in order to investigate the relationship between the growth of the service 
sectors and the overall growth of the economies for these four dragons in Asia. The average 
growth rates of the service sectors of the four dragons ranged from 4.01% to 5.06% in the 
period under study, with some volatility in Singapore and Hong Kong, China as indicated by 
Figure 3 and Table 9. 
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Hong Kong, China Korea Singapore Taipei,China
 
Sources: The data for Taipei,China are from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics (DGBAS), 
Taipei,China (at http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw/) while the data of the other three dragons are from World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI) Online Databases (at http://www.worldbank.org). 
Note: Korea=The Republic of Korea 
Table 9: Growth Rates of Service Sectors in the Four Asian Dragons, 1995–2008 
(%) 




Singapore  Taipei,China 
Average  4.01  4.84  5.06  4.39 
C.V.  1.77  0.74  1.04  0.49 
Max  10.54  11.21  9.33  7.09 
Min  (13.79)  (3.94)  (9.66)  0.08 
Source: Figure 3. 
C.V. = Coefficient of Variation ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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The estimated impacts of the growth of the manufacturing sector, the service sector, exports, 
and gross fixed capital formation on economic growth in the four Asian NIEs are presented 
in Table 10. Please note that the estimated results of the fixed-effects model are only the 
indication of an average trend observed in these four Asian dragons due to the data 
limitation for the overall period 1995–2008. The coefficients of the independent variables 
indicate the relationships between the growth rates of the determinants and the growth rates 
of the economies (as measured by GDP). For example, an increase in the growth rate of the 
service sector by 1% raises the growth rate of GDP by 0.3959%, on average, among the 
four Asian dragons. The estimated results suggest that the impacts of growth in the service 
sectors, exports, and gross fixed capital formation, as major determinants of the GDP growth 
rate,  are positive and statistically significant at a level of at least 2%.  Although the 
manufacturing sector is still  very important, the  service sector has demonstrated  its 
increasingly important contribution to GDP by contributing  the highest percentage from 
within the domestic industrial structure for the group of four dragons. The results suggest the 
significant contributions of the growth of the service sectors to the growth of GDP, while the 
importance of the manufacturing sector is observed as insignificant in the model. This can be 
taken as a symptom of the structural changes that have taken place in the Asian dragons. 
The values of R-squared  and the adjusted R-squared
5
Table 10: Empirical Results of the Fixed-Effects Model 
, 0.7429 and 0.7011 respectively, 
imply that the estimated fixed-effects model is equipped with reasonable explanatory power. 
The empirical results reflect the economic structural changes that have taken place in each 
of the four dragons, and lend weight to the assertion that their sources of economic growth 
have  indeed  gradually  shifted  away  from  their  manufacturing sectors and  toward  their 
service sectors. 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t value  Pr > |t| 
Constant  0.8481*    0.4641  1.8275  0.0746 
Manufacturing sector growth rate  0.0336      0.0510  0.6579  0.5141 
Service sector growth rate  0.3959***  0.0745  5.3133  0.0000 
Export growth rate  0.1878***    0.0499  3.7609  0.0005 
Gross fixed capital formation growth rate  0.0610**   0.0241  2.5313  0.0151 
    R-squared  0.7429 
    Adjusted R-squared  0.7011 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the GDP growth rate; (2) ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
The estimated results are not surprising, given the fact of the increasingly stronger impacts 
of exports and the service sectors on the growth rates of GDP in the export-led four dragons. 
The  results deriving from the  fixed-effects model indicate  economic structural changes 
consistent with the growing emphasis on the service sector observed in each of the four 
Asian dragons over the past two to three decades (Froehle et al. 2000).  
The growth of the service sector also directly promotes the employment of labor and this, 
along with the technological progress and relatively low labor costs that characterize each of 
the four economies, contributes to GDP growth. As discussed earlier, not all service sector 
production is low value-added  or  deploys workers with  less productivity than in 
manufacturing (Besley 2007; Malgorzata and Marcin 2009). As suggested by most of the 
literature, the contribution from an increase in gross fixed capital formation to the growth of 
GDP is not surprising and helps explain the overall growth of the economies.  
                                                 
5 R-squared (the coefficient of determination) provides a measure of how well the variations of the dependent 
variable are likely to be explained or predicted by the model, the estimated value ranges from 0 – 1 with 0 
indicating no predictive power and 1 indicating perfect prediction. The adjusted R-squared takes the reduced 
degrees of freedom into consideration. ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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The positive but statistically insignificant effect of the growth rate of manufacturing sector on 
GDP growth again indicates that the driving force of economic growth has shifted away from 
the manufacturing sector. Traditionally, total factor measures of productivity have included 
human labor, energy, materials, and capital (Eloranta and Holmstrom 1998). The significant 
impact of service sector growth rates and the insignificant impact of manufacturing sector 
growth rates found in the above application of the fixed-effects model support the finding of 
Bottazzi, Secchi, and Tamagni (2008). This further supports the argument offered by Triplett 
and Bosworth (2004) regarding the contribution of the service sector to productivity. 
4.  THE RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC SHOCKS FOR NEW 
SERVICE DEVELOPMENT 
The economic and financial infrastructure of the four  Asian  dragons  was seriously 
compromised by both the 1997 Asian financial  crisis and the  2008  global economic 
recession. Before the onset of the subprime loan crisis in 2008, it appeared that the service 
sector was becoming increasingly important to the economies of these  economies.  The 
trends of globalization and accelerating technological progress have led to  the 
predomination of services in most developed economies (Froehle et al. 2000). For example, 
enterprises such as GE (capital services), IBM (consulting services), and Amazon (online 
services) have pioneered new service development (NSD)
6
Nowadays,  manufacturing  industries  integrate  service operations. Even the retailing 
industries (Peterson and Balasubramanian 2002) and after-sales services (Johansson and 
Olhager 2004) are very different to  those  of the  late  20th century. Development of new 
service industries is therefore strongly encouraged  in many countries  because industrial 
development and computer science promote innovation, which, in turn, contribute as major 
drivers of economic growth. However, NSD is  very often attributed to the manufacturing 
sector, rather than the service sector. NSD can strengthen the value-added connection 
between manufacturing industries and the service sector, and this could become the focal 
point of future economic growth. Due to the different factors contributing to the recent crisis, 
we discuss the economic shocks these four economies experienced during this period below. 
 to obtain a competitive edge 
over their competitors and this has changed the landscape of the service industry. If this kind 
of industrial advantage were to support the economic growth of emerging economies, which 
amounts to half of all global economic growth in a given year, a global meltdown could be 
avoided (Carrasco 2009). 
4.1  Hong Kong, China 
In terms of its degree of openness, Hong Kong, China is one of the most open economies in 
the world. Growth in this open economy was hit by a heavy blow at the end of 2008, which 
was followed by the global economic recession and the trade slump indicated in Table 1. For 
the year, consumption and fixed investment did not grow at their usual rates. The important 
financial markets and real estate service industries were constricted in the second half of 
2008. In 2009, exports fell and both private consumption and investment shrank when global 
trade slumped. In Table 1, a slump in both GDP and export growth rates is observed, while 
the exchange rate remains relatively stable. The deterioration in both external and domestic 
demand has seen businesses reduce investments in machinery and equipment since the 
fourth quarter of 2008. The global economic recession happened during the development of 
                                                 
6 NSD is the overall process of developing new service offerings in response to customers’ expectations. It is 
concerned with all stages of development from idea to launch (Edvardsson 1997; Goldstein et al. 2002). It 
involves developing service offerings such as information services, consulting services, telecommunications 
services, health care, and financial services (Johne and Storey 1998). The new service offering may be a re-
design of an existing service or be created from a new idea. The proliferation of NSD means that investment in 
services R&D is important for modern organizations to stay competitive. ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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the standard marketplace for new service while Hong Kong, China was undergoing internal 
structural changes of its base. It included both the operational activities and the linkages 
among different activities of the service organization that deliver intensified level of service 
quality. Though the NSD that was taking place in Hong Kong, China at that time is now 
receiving increased attention, the NSD process has been interrupted by the recent economic 
shock and associated global recession. A recovered support from the government of Hong 
Kong, China in 2009 may help set the basis of another stage for new services to develop 
with a commercial focus. 
Real exports of goods and trade-related services were weak in 2009 compared with 2008. 
For this service-based economy, the lengthy global economic recession and the slump in 
both trade and tourism have  further damaged  service exports,  while,  in the meantime, 
merchandise re-exports have remained sluggish. Imports have also contracted, given the 
decline in domestic demand. The service sector is responsible for virtually all of GDP, and its 
overall growth has slowed to 2.5% since 2001. Although the development of new services 
are an important source of revenue for most companies in Hong Kong, China, the finance, 
insurance, and real estate subsectors were hit even harder. Both the manufacturing sector 
and the service sector contracted in both the third and fourth quarters of 2009. Nevertheless, 
the service sector was the only sector that contributed to GDP growth in 2009. On the whole, 
the performance of service companies did reflect the potential for the stimulus of economy 
behind the slow development in 2009. 
Moreover, production in the small manufacturing and agricultural sectors also fell in 2008 
(Alam 2002). The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region adjusted for 
contractions  through  fiscal concessions which lowered  the  prices  of  some of the 
commodities underlying inflation, yet it unfortunately may miss the precious opportunity to 
develop the base for NSD. 
4.2  Republic of Korea 
Severely affected by the global downturn and weakened domestic demand, the Republic of 
Korea’s GDP growth fell in 2008 to less than half of the almost 5% rate recorded in 2007. 
Notwithstanding the fact of weakened external demand, net exports still accounted for over 
90% of total GDP growth, a fact reflecting the even greater fragility of domestic demand. 
While the global downturn caused the Republic of Korea’s economy to slow down, reduced 
private consumption and investment have enlarged its effects. It is obvious that the Republic 
of Korea’s economic performance is highly sensitive to the global business cycle, especially 
when it is observed that the growth rates of exports and GDP plunged to –25% and –4.25% 
respectively in the first quarter of 2009 (see Table 2). The recession and associated lower 
disposable incomes, which result in poor sales for items such as automobiles, electronics, 
and other durable goods, explain much of the decrease in imports and exports of domestic 
consumer goods. The same applies to the reduction in imports of capital goods, which will 
result in lower levels of production in next period. 
Over the past few years, the electronics industry in the Republic of Korea has developed 
rapidly. Korean electronics companies—themselves promising enterprises for the practice of 
NSD—occupy a significant place in the world electronics market. As a result of its steady 
emphasis on research and development, the Korean electronics industry has narrowed the 
gap in technological expertise with advanced countries to a greater degree than the other 
Asian dragons. It was for this reason that the Republic of Korea’s electronics exports grew in 
the first three quarters of 2008, before experiencing a slowdown in the fourth quarter and a 
further slump in the first two quarters in 2009 when the impact of the global downturn struck 
Korean exporters with full force. All major export products faced weaker demand in all major 
markets. For the full year, the trade surplus fell sharply and the current account moved into 
deficit (estimated at a modest 0.7% of GDP) for the first time since 1997. Private ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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consumption rose by a mere 0.5% in 2008, down sharply from 4.5% growth in 2007. Fixed 
capital investment fell by 1.9% in 2008, compared with robust growth of 4.0% in 2007. 
In 1993, the Republic of Korea was one of the six largest electronics production countries in 
the world. At that time, production exceeded US$36 billion and total exports topped US$22 
billion. As a result, the Republic of Korea’s electronics industry emerged as its largest export 
sector. Despite its rapid progress and economic recovery since 2008, the Korean electronics 
industry faces serious challenges due to growing protectionism abroad coupled with 
decreasing profitability. Having contributed greatly to the Korean economy's development, 
the Republic of Korea’s  electronics industry has been at the core of the country’s 
manufacturing sector in terms of new service development and has pushed the Republic of 
Korea to be evenly matched in terms of the international competitiveness of its economy  
with the major advanced economies. 
4.3  Singapore 
Singapore is more highly dependent on trade than the other Asian economies and this gap 
has increased in recent years. A wide range of Singapore’s services also depend on trade. 
As a financial center, Singapore  will suffer more than other economies from the global 
economic recession. Moreover, it is a sub-regional headquarters for multinational companies, 
many of which are trimming their operations. The government realizes that new service-
oriented industries or knowledge-based service industries may stimulate an economic boost 
in the future and so have devised policy instruments that support NSD within industries that 
offer technology-related services (Skogli 1998). 
Singapore has been one of the Asian export-oriented economies most badly hit by the global 
economic crisis. This is demonstrated by the drop in export growth rates to –27.77% and –
25.32% respectively for the first and second quarters of 2009. For the same periods, GDP 
growth  also  fell  to  –10.14% and –2.8% (see  Table 3).  After the manufacturing  sector 
suffered the heaviest blow, Singapore made strategic efforts to support manufacturing and 
IT-related services to help develop new industries effectively. At that time, the base of new 
service development has been established. However, growth in manufacturing continued to 
fall—to 10.7% in the fourth quarter of 2008 and to 4.1% for the entire year of 2009. 
Weakening global demand drove the manufacturing slump in Singapore, which was greatest 
in the electronics and biomedical industries. Non-oil exports declined from the first quarter of 
2008 to the third quarter of 2009—among them electronics exports (largely components of 
computers and computer-related equipment such as hard disk drives) fell by about 30% in 
the first two months of 2009 and non-electronic exports dropped by almost 20%. 
Moving closely with the global business cycle, growth decelerated during 2008 on a year-on-
year basis and declined in the fourth quarter. The economy shrank in 2008. The global 
downturn struck this open economy with full force in 2008 when GDP contracted as a result 
of the global slump in information technology-related goods. Reflecting the high correlation 
between the global business cycle and Singapore’s economic performance, GDP growth 
slowed from 6.7% in the first quarter of 2008 to 2.5% in the second quarter. There was a 
4.2% contraction in the fourth quarter of 2008 and a 10.1% contraction in the first quarter of 
2009 (see Table 3). These conditions created great difficulties for  the  international 
businesses in Singapore trying to make progress on NSD. Singapore commenced a mild 
rebound in the third quarter of 2009 as the global economic situation started to improve. 
4.4  Taipei,China 
Seriously reliant on external trade, Taipei,China suffered more than most other economies in 
the second half of 2008, as the global slowdown cut into world trade. An important reason for 
this  is that the economy’s  high-tech  industries in the manufacturing sector  occupy a 
significant place in global goods markets. After growing by an average of 5.4% in the first ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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two quarters of 2008, GDP started to decline in the third quarter of 2008 and continued to do 
so until its rebound in the fourth quarter of 2009. GDP contracted by 8.5%, 10.2%, and 6.9% 
respectively in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first two quarters of 2009. The slowdown 
over 2008 stemmed from a slump in exports of machinery and electronics products and the 
sluggishness of fixed investment over the same period. The weakness in domestic demand 
was offset by some growth in net exports, this being the main reason for the expansion of 
GDP in the final quarter of 2009. Domestic demand contracted and inflation increased over 
its previous 14-year level but had declined by the end of 2008. 
Due to Taipei,China’s heavy dependence on external demand, the government formulated a 
national initiative for the strategic support of NSD in order to promote new and high value-
added services in the manufacturing sector. Exports and imports of goods and services were 
equivalent to about 70% of GDP in 2008. This reflects the extension of manufacturing 
production chains with neighboring economies, particularly the PRC. Moreover, the US is the 
final destination for much of the output from these production chains. Nevertheless in 2008, 
Taipei,China’s exports of merchandise goods to the PRC grew by 7.2% while exports to the 
US fell by 4.0%. Meanwhile, the Industrial Technology Research Institute  (ITRI)  in 
Taipei,China has made significant contributions to NSD by providing various industries with 
knowledge and prototypes in manufacturing-oriented  technology development. The NSD 
initiative being funded by this non-profit organization enhances core competencies and helps 
transfer successful NSD experiences to other industries  while  service-based technology 
development is still evolving. Since more than 97% of companies on the island are small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the funding incentives  provided by various NSD 
programs may help these companies speed up the process of transformation and enlarge 
their capacities for innovation. 
The NSD model would also help to enhance the productivity of the traditional service sectors 
and thereby raise wages for workers and create more jobs than would be the case solely in 
the capital-intensive electronics industry. Owing to the intangibility of services, as well as the 
uncertainty and complexity inherent in  the integration of the manufacturing and service 
sectors, the development of service-oriented products may confront unexpected challenges.  
Although the NSD development process has not turned out any great successes thus far, 
the high-end services driven by high-technology and generally strong manufacturing bases 
in both the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China could still be crucial for future development. 
In contrast, the service sector has been a core pillar of economic growth in both Singapore 
and Hong Kong, China. Strongly connected with worldwide financial markets, companies in 
Singapore and Hong Kong, China can take full advantage of global capital convergence and 
the high value-added services created by NSD. Given the globalizing trend, world-leading 
companies in the four Asian dragons need to pursue their respective models of NSD in order 
to mitigate the volatility that arises from over-reliance on exports. 
For the four Asian dragons, the recent economic crisis could turn out to be an opportunity to 
boost financial integration within Asia as well as the region’s global economic status. It also 
reveals that the four economies should not only rely on their manufacturing sectors, but also 
on their  service sectors. The  raging global economic recession has removed the main 
objections that were raised against the establishment of the Asian Monetary Fund in 1997, 
and has made Asians better able to appreciate the importance and benefits of self-insurance 
(Woo 2010). Further, the PRC is already one of the most important exporting and importing 
nations worldwide (Fidrmuc and Korhonen 2009). ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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5.  MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICIES FOR THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC RECESSION 
The four Asian dragon economies went into a slump in 2008 and unemployment rates rose 
as the impact of the global economic recession spread all over the world. The policies 
adopted by the governments of these four economies during the period of crisis will influence 
their recovery of export-led growth in the future. In this section, the major macroeconomic 
stabilization policies of the four Asian dragons are briefly discussed. 
5.1  Hong Kong, China 
Although its free and open economy makes Hong Kong, China a unique development model, 
it was nevertheless, to some extent,  also  a victim of  the recent global economic crisis 
stemming from the US subprime loan crisis. In light of the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, the 
Government  of  the  Hong Kong  Special Administrative Region  conducted  a full and 
comprehensive review of the regulatory framework for the securities and futures markets, in 
order to determine how best to further improve the framework and enhance protections for 
investors. With its enhanced regulatory framework, established production base, and market 
in the PRC, the economy is well-equipped to withstand the downturn. The government has 
endeavored to turn this crisis into an opportunity by sustaining economic development in 
sectors such as financial services, infrastructure, and scientific research. 
To assure liquidity in the banking sector, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) has 
been injecting substantial capital into the interbank market. Two preemptive measures have 
been introduced to strengthen confidence in Hong Kong, China’s banking system: (i) the use 
of the Exchange Fund to guarantee repayment of the US dollar and foreign-currency 
deposits held within all authorized institutions in Hong Kong, China, including branches of 
overseas institutions; and (ii) the establishment of a Contingent Bank Capital Facility to both 
make available  to  and  ensure  sufficient  capital  for  locally incorporated banks. These 
measures will be in place until the end of 2010. 
The Government has also supported SMEs, which have been greatly affected by the credit 
crunch.  A  Loan Guarantee Scheme and Export Marketing Fund  for  SMEs  have been 
established. A US$100 billion Special Loan Guarantee Scheme (SpGS) has been launched 
to provide an up-to-70% guarantee to commercial-financing companies that extend loans to 
local companies. The maximum loan that each enterprise may obtain under the SpGS is 
US$6 million, and US$3 million of that amount can be used for debt and letters of credit. All 
companies except listed companies may apply. In spite of the economic downturn, the 
government has not cut its public expenditure, and this includes the budgets for healthcare, 
social welfare, education,  and environmental  protection. To add to the 60,000 job 
opportunities created by infrastructure projects in 2009, advanced recruitment of citizens and 
the creation of part-time jobs have been promoted in the 18 administrative districts. 
5.2  Republic of Korea 
The Government of the Republic of Korea learned its lesson from the Asian financial crisis 
and responded swiftly to the economic downturn that attended the 2008–2009 economic 
crisis. To stabilize the financial system and foreign investment, the government preemptively 
removes uncertainty in the currency and financial markets stemming from the global 
economic recession (Republic of Korea’s  Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2009).  The 
Republic of Korea has implemented the largest project among the Asian dragons to rescue 
stock market investors. The government spent US$240 billion to stabilize the stock market, 
the volatility of which had caused all banks and financial departments to suffer. The Korea 
Development Bank and the Foreign Trade Bank of Korea provided a three-year W100 billion 
guarantee for local banks in the foreign exchange market. To ensure that there is a sufficient ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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supply of liquidity in the banking sector, the authority is injecting a further W300 billion into 
the main banks. 
The government has endeavored to proceed with the reform of the industrial structure by 
formulating  its  monetary policies. It has  provided  a W9 billion credit-loan for SMEs  and, 
moreover,  an additional W1.2 trillion bonds will be expected to  support enterprises. The 
government  has  also developed  finance  policies  to  stimulate domestic consumption. For 
example, to revitalize the economy the government has proposed legislating a  five-year 
W20.7 trillion tax cut to stimulate domestic consumption and investment. 
The government has provided  a budget of W14 trillion  to  create more job  opportunities. 
These are short-term job opportunities, provided for those who are in need. The budget is 
estimated to generate 880,000 job opportunities, which will help some people to return to the 
labor market when economic conditions have improved. With these stabilization measures, 
the government aims to make sure of sufficient liquidity in the foreign exchange market by 
stabilizing exchange rates. More supplies of liquidity will be provided for banks, securities 
firms, and asset management firms, which seek stability in the domestic financial market. 
The requirements for issuing bonds will also be improved in order to maintain lower levels of 
interest rates. Moreover, more investment decisions will be made by state-owned banks, i.e., 
the Korea Development Bank and the Industrial Bank of Korea, so as to provide financial 
support for SMEs. 
5.3  Singapore 
The demand for exports manufactured in Asia has slowed dramatically as a result of the 
global economic downturn. The highly open economy of Singapore  has suffered from 
plunging GDP and exports since the fourth quarter of 2008. The policymakers of Singapore 
made a number of responses to the global economic recession. To sustain banking systems, 
the authorities emulated the responses of the US and Europe, i.e., they  guaranteed the 
repayment of deposits in authorized institutions, and rescinded regulatory accounting rules 
so that declines in net asset values—such as prices of equity held by the banks—would not 
cause a severe credit crunch. The Monetary Authority of Singapore has tried to convince the 
public that its banking system is sound, with the promise that the government will intervene if 
necessary. The Foreign Exchange Rate Policy has been shifted from “modest and gradual 
appreciation”  to  “nil appreciation”  in order to boost the  competitiveness of manufactured 
exports.  Further, policymakers have  guaranteed  to compensate investors who  bought 
structured notes linked to Lehman Aggregate Bonds. In an attempt to stabilize the financial 
system in the context of a global economic recession, the government has fully guaranteed 
deposit withdrawals for a certain period of time. 
The authority has  also provided  about S$20.5  billion to stimulate  investment in public 
infrastructure. Unlike other countries in Asia, the Government of Singapore does not borrow 
money from any other country. It has taken S$4.9 billion from its central bank to support two 
temporary subsidy and tax discount initiatives. The government is also developing financing 
policies to further stimulate domestic demand and has budgeted S$2.3 billion to help SMEs. 
By providing liquidity in the market, the government has made it easier for those enterprises 
to go through the global economic recession. About 124,000 companies will benefit from this 
project. The government also took SGD$1.8 billion and distributed it to citizens of 21-years 
of age and above.. Everyone on average could get at least SGD$100. 
5.4  Taipei,China 
In response to the depression of domestic demand brought on by the economic downturn, 
the Government of Taipei,China has adopted various measures to ensure economic growth 
and stimulate demand. An “Economic Revitalization Policy” has been instigated to stimulate 
investment in public works. The authorities hope that the implementation of 20 key public ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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work projects and 64 special local investment plans will help to mitigate the prevailing 
economic  hardship.  A  governmental program to  distribute consumption vouchers to all 
nationals was also promptly implemented with a total value of NT$3,600 in vouchers being 
made available to each person. The NT$82.9 billion (about US$2.55 billion at the exchange 
rate of NT$32.5  = USD$1) program  is  expected, at least to some extent, to promote 
domestic economic growth by stimulating domestic consumption. Second, the authority has 
created more than NT$560 billion worth of infrastructure projects in order to inject funds into 
the economy and thereby  stimulate  domestic demand.  Furthermore, the authority has 
initiated  negotiations  with  the PRC  on  an  Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA) for trade liberalization and this may drive additional economic growth. 
The government is also developing monetary policies with the aim of reforming the industrial 
structure. A credit-loan of NT$300 billion has been provided for SMEs, in addition to a further 
budget allotment of NT$300 billion for  enterprise financing. Under the supervision of the 
financial supervisory commission, a government security fund has been injected  into the 
stock market and short-selling has been forbidden. The government has also introduced a 
series of employment measures  which  may  generate  between  190,000  and  220,000  job 
opportunities. By planning employment promotion measures to revitalize the economy, the 
government aims to respond appropriately to the unemployment triggered by the global 
economic recession and make good use of human resources and physical infrastructure to 
boost national competitiveness. However, the effectiveness of these measures for achieving 
the multiple objectives of creating new jobs, stimulating domestic demand, and caring for the 
disadvantaged will need to be evaluated in the future.  
The governments of four Asian dragons all implemented some timely policies to mitigate the 
harsh  impacts  of  the global economic recession. Due to the financial meltdown of US 
markets in the last quarter of 2008, each government was compelled to stimulate domestic 
demand in the  face of the unexpected slump  in  exports.  In addition,  the  measures 
implemented to deal with the unemployment and fiscal deficits that have emerged from the 
global economic recession have also attracted the attention of the public in these economies. 
The major remaining concern is whether the expensive rescue packages will only generate 
jobless recoveries. If government  policies are effective and efficient, this represents an 
opportunity to rebalance the economy-wide environment, especially in terms of enhancing 
social welfare and national competitiveness, which might, in turn, create opportunities for 
industrial restructuring as well as new service development. 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although the global crisis that erupted in 2008 was largely limited to the financial sector in its 
initial stages,  by 2009 it had  become clear that the world was witnessing a full-blown 
economic crisis—the worst since the Great Depression  (Carrasco  2009). To formulate a 
plausible future path of development leading out of the global economic recession for the 
four outward-oriented economies of Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; 
and Taipei,China, the determinants of economic growth rates during the previous crises in 
1997 and 2001 were examined. The panel data for the four Asian dragons for the period 
1995–2008 was constructed and a fixed-effects model was applied. The empirical findings 
indicated that the impacts on the growth of GDP from the growth rates of the service sector, 
exports, and gross fixed capital formation are positive and statistically significant; while the 
effect of growth in the manufacturing sector is also positive but not significant. This also 
suggests that the shift away from the manufacturing sector and toward the service sector as 
a major factor in economic growth deserves special attention, in the light of the collapse of 
exports that has taken place in these four outward-oriented growth economies. It is clear that 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2001 bursting of the US high-tech bubble, and then the 
2008–09 global economic crisis each led to a decline in the growth rates of exports for each 
of the four economies. New service development (NSD), which integrates high-tech or more ADBI Working Paper 315    Hsieh 
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sophisticated manufacturing products with information technology, telecommunications, and 
consulting functions to offer high value-added services, may serve as an engine to facilitate 
future economic growth and deserves more attention, especially in the policymaking circles 
of the four Asian dragons. 
Efficiency analyses based on value-added  and cost measures are  appropriate when 
studying industrial competitiveness (Eloranta and Holmstrom 1998). Traditionally, total factor 
measures  of productivity include labor and capital, materials,  and intermediate inputs. 
However, the classical measure of productivity, defined as physical volumes per capita, may 
underestimate the productivity of the service sector as discussed in this paper. The social 
welfare and employment generated by one dollar invested in the manufacturing sector could 
be much less  than that in the service sector. Comparing the  manufacturing and service 
sectors,  Bottazzi, Secchi, and Tamagni  (2008) found that although labor productivity is 
slightly more persistent in the manufacturing sector when compared to the service sector, 
the opposite holds for capital productivity. 
With  the importance of the service sectors  to the economies of four Asian dragons 
increasing  since  the subprime loan crisis in 2008,  the concept of NSD  has  also  gained 
increasing importance. NSD has changed the landscape of the service industries by creating 
new  levels of competitiveness  and  it  is strongly emphasized in many countries. The 
development opportunities offered by NSD and the experience of industrial innovation within 
the four Asian dragons, are worthy of further discussion with regard to the role they will play 
in future economic growth. 
With regard to  Hong Kong, China,  the  higher productivity growth of  manufacturing  than 
services could be the result of the movement of production jobs abroad or the outsourcing of 
service-related activities. Service industries in Hong Kong, China have been consistently 
more profitable than manufacturing since 1989 (Brook 2009). Take Table 5 for example, the 
share of value-added in GDP for the service sector in Hong Kong, China was 94.88. Relative 
small portion of productivity growth in  the service sector contributes more to the overall 
economy than the same percentage in the manufacturing sector. Both the Republic of Korea 
and Taipei,China, on the other hand, with their strong bases in the electronics subsector of 
the manufacturing sector, have developed different models of NSD as the new engines to 
help them grow out of  the global economic recession.  Singapore, to a  lesser extent, is 
focusing on its role as a financial center although the government has realized that new 
service-oriented industries or knowledge-based service industries may help to stimulate an 
economic boost in the future. The competitiveness-based niche of the four Asian dragons 
represents a potentially fruitful environment for NSD and, in turn, a promising opportunity for 
both labor and capital.  
Although there is hardship ahead for the four Asian dragons as they make their way through 
the period of global economic recession  arising from the 2008 crisis,  this time also 
represents an opportunity to endow these economies with the unique competitive edge that 
results  from integrating the manufacturing  and  service sectors.  As long as  government 
policies are effective and efficient, now is  the best time  to rebalance the economy-wide 
environment and create good opportunities for these four export-led economies to proceed 
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